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Employee Rights and Relocated Plants
Defendant corporation terminated the employment of Plaintiffs
and its other employees and moved its plant from New York to
Pennsylvania shortly before termination of its collective bargain-
ing agreement, which provided for a number of benefits including
lay-offs in reverse order of seniority. An employee who had at least
five years' continuous employment was entitled to reemployment
if an opening for one of his seniority occurred within three years
after his lay-off.' The agreement, in its preamble, recited that it was
made by Defendant, "for and on behalf of its plant facilities located
at Corona Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New
York." When the plant was moved, Defendant retired employees
who had satisfied the conditions prescribed for receiving retirement
pay and advised others, who had sufficient service for their retire-
ment rights to be vested according to the agreement, that they would
begin receiving payments when they reached age sixty-five. De-
fendant offered to consider former employees who came to Bethlehem
on the same basis as new applicants. There was no collective bargain-
ing agreement at the new plant. The trial court found that the
decision to relocate was made in good faith by Defendant's Board
of Directors and was not made with intent to defraud Plaintiffs of
any of their rights.! Plaintiffs contended that they, as beneficiaries
of the contract between their union and Defendant, were entitled
to go to work at Bethlehem with the seniority and other benefits
which they had acquired at Elmhurst. Defendant argued that Plain-
tiffs individually had no standing to sue, that the collective bargain-
ing agreement conferred on the employees no rights which survived
the contract, and that the terms of the agreement limited its effective-
ness solely to the Elmhurst plant.' Held, reversed and remanded:
' The agreement contained a non-contributory pension plan and included medical and
life insurance to be paid for by the employer. 185 F. Supp. at 444. The arbitration pro-
vision stated, "Any question, grievance or dispute arising out of and involving the inter-
pretation and application of the specific terms of this Agreement . . . shall, at the
request of either party, be referred . . . for arbitration." Id. at 445.
' After an unsuccessful attempt by the union in the state court to enforce arbitration,
the Plaintiffs, who had been with the company from 10 to 25 years, brought this suit,
which was removed to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
3 Defendant also offered the defense of res judicata; but, the state court action
brought by the union to enforce arbitration was held res judicata only as to the decision
that the arbitration provision, as narrowly written referring to disputes arising from specific
terms of the agreement, did not confer jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute in question.
185 F. Supp. at 445-46. It is interesting to note that this case illustrates a situation where
an employee has rights not enforceable by arbitration which are, nevertheless, enforceable
by the court. Although the Plaintiffs could have presented a separate issue regarding their
rights under the pension and insurance plans, they did not rely upon any provision con-
tained in special agreements setting up these plans; rather, they asserted that they had
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The rights embodied in a collective bargaining agreement inure to
the direct benefit of employees and may be the subject of a cause
of action by them. Vested rights acquired under seniority provisions
survive the termination of the agreement. Unless the geographic
scope of a collective bargaining agreement is limited, employees may
"follow" their vested rights to a new plant. Zdanok. v. Glidden Co.,
288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), reversing 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) .4
The essence of the free enterprise system in labor relations is that
labor and management are free to bargain over the terms and con-
ditions of employment s The individual employee's terms of employ-
ment, therefore, are usually to be found in the collective bargaining
agreement! As in commercial contracts, when there is doubt as to
the intent of the parties, the agreement should be interpreted in light
of its background' and the customs of the industry A consideration
not present in the case of other contracts is the impact of the national
labor policy.9 Moreover, through implied covenants enforceable
obligations can be imposed by the agreement even though they are
not expressed in words." The Taft-Hartley Act provides that, when
the union is a party, federal courts shall have jurisdiction over suits
involving violation of collective bargaining agreements." In Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills" the Supreme Court interpreted this pro-
vision stating:
been deprived of rights under each of the plans by reason of the Defendant's alleged breach
of the seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement. 185 F. Supp. at 449.
' Judge Madden of the United States Court of Claims participated as one of the three
judges in the court of appeals decision. Although the Supreme Court granted motions to file
amicus curiae briefs for an additional ten interested parties, see note 30 infra, the grant of
certiorari was limited to the determination of the sole question, "Does the participation by
a Court of Claims Judge vitiate the judgment of the Court of Appeals?" 30 U.S.L. Week
3112 (October 10, 1961).
' This is the fundamental policy of the National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958); see Cox, Law and
the National Labor Policy 11 (1960). See generally id. 1-20.
6 Anson v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 222 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1955), citing J. I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944).
'United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (concurring
opinion).
' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
'Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 468 (1960).
'" E.g., Williston states every contract contains, "an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every contract there exists
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 3 Williston, Contracts § 670 (rev. ed.
1936); see Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy 74 (1960). See also United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (concurring opinion). See generally Cox,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 64-85.
"Section 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185a (1958).
1"353 U.S. 448, 456, 457 (1957).
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[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws. . . .The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by
the nature of the problem. Federal interpretation of the federal law
will govern, not state law. But state law, if compatible with the pur-
pose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will
be absorbed as federal law, and will not be an independent source of
private rights.
Thus, Congress has given the federal courts broad power to create
a federal common law for the interpretation of collective bargain-
ing agreements. However, the right of a union under section 301 to
compel exercise of federal jurisdiction over a suit for violation of
a collective bargaining agreement is limited in one respect; the
Supreme Court has held section 301 does not "authorize a union to en-
force in a federal court the uniquely personal rights of an employee.""
Personal rights arising from the collective bargaining agreement
may be enforced by the individual employee. 4 These rights accrue
to the employee "somewhat as a third party beneficiary" by virtue
of the National Labor Relations Act. s For example, seniority rights
arise only out of contract or statute, since an employee has no
inherent right to seniority in service.'" By the same token, collective
bargaining agreements creating a seniority system do not per se
create a permanent status or give an unlimited tenure to employees.'
Rights normally remain in force only for the life of the contract, s
but they may persist beyond the term of the collective bargaining
agreement when the agreement so provides or is susceptible to such
construction.'" Therefore, all rights under a collective bargaining
agreement are not automatically terminated by relocation of an
employer's plant; whether such rights continue depends on the terms
of the contract."' Wide variations exist in seniority systems used in
industry. With respect to the unit covered, an entire multi-plant
"Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 348 U.S.
437 (1955); see Recent Case Note, 15 Sw. L.J. 360 (1961).
'
4 Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1958), citing Association of
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Parker
v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1959), citing Barth v. Addie Co., 271
N.Y. 31, 2 N.E.2d 34 (1936).
"J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See generally Hanslowe, Individual
Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959).
"NLRB v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959); see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls,
331 U.S. 40 (1947).
'
7 E.g., Shiels v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 154 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Ind. 1957), aff'd, 254
F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 846 (1958).
s Shiels v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 17.
'"See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
"See Metal Polishers Union v. Viking Equip. Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1960) (per
curiam).
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company or district may be made subject to the same system, or
the system may be limited to a particular plant, department, or
occupation."
The parties being free to agree upon whatever seniority system
they wish, the question presented by this case was merely: What
did the parties agree upon? The provision in the agreement that in
the event of lay-off an employee was entitled to reemployment if
an opening for one of his seniority occurred within three years after
his lay-off, was held to carry with it an implied condition that the
seniority rights themselves necessarily extend beyond the termina-
tion of the agreement for the three year period.2 Speaking of seniority
as "valuable insurance against unemployment," the court reasoned:
If one has in October a right to demand performance of the correspond-
ing obligation at any relevant time within a period of three years, it
would be strange if the other contracting party could unilaterally
terminate the right at the end of three weeks. . . We think the
plaintiff employees had . . . "earned" their valuable unemployment
insurance, and that their rights in it were "vested" and could not be
unilaterally annulled.2
In concluding that the geographic scope of the agreement was not
limited to the plant, the court held, "that the statement of location
was nothing more than a reference to the then existing situation,"
and had no vital significance. 4 The court believed that the con-
tract must be interpreted in a manner which would not defeat the
"reasonable expectations of the parties." '
The significance of the decision is at the moment difficult to
evaluate. Narrowly construed, the court has only interpreted the
agreement in question. When given a broad construction, the ruling
is that unless specifically stated to the contrary, there is no geographi-
cal limit to a collective bargaining agreement, and a clause in a
seniority provision which confers a right of reemployment for a
given period after lay-off extends all seniority rights beyond the
termination of the agreement for that given period." The dissent
21 185 F. Supp. at 447.
22But cf. Local 2040, IAM v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959). The court held that discontinuance of all manufacturing operations by
employer justified discharge of employees, including those who had previously been laid off;
and under collective bargaining agreement, properly construed, employees did not acquire
permanent lay-off status or vested rights to seniority for two years following their lay-off.
23288 F.2d at 103.
"
4 Id. at 104.
2s 2 8 8 F.2d at 104.
26 It is interesting to note how far the court has gone in broadly construing employee
rights by explaining away the preamble to the agreement and the lack of uniformity among
seniority systems in industry.
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followed the reasoning of the district court that this particular
collective bargaining agreement did not give the employees the
right to "follow the work" to the new site, saying:
As Judge Palmieri points out, it is not uncommon for the parties to ex-
tend beyond a single plant the area in which seniority rights are to
apply. Surely unions are now fully of age and are able to protect
themselves and their members at the bargaining table. The consequences
of dismissing the plaintiffs' case might indeed be unfortunate and even
"catastrophic" from their point of view, but it is hardly "irrational
and destructive" for a court to leave the parties as they are if they
have never seen fit to provide otherwise."7
Moreover, to determine the status and application of seniority
rights, it would seem that one can look only to the particular cir-
cumstances in view of the wide diversity among seniority plans in
industry.
Although this is not a case invoking jurisdiction under section
301,21 it has widespread significance because it may serve as prec-
edent under the broad directive of the Supreme Court in the
Lincoln Mills decision for the federal courts to create a federal sub-
stantive law to be used in interpreting collective bargaining agree-
ments in disputes between unions and employers."9 So great has
been the importance attached to this case throughout the country,
that the Supreme Court granted ten motions to file amicus curiae
briefs."5 The ruling in the instant case could have the effect of creat-
ing new provisions or causing doubt about existing agreements.
Moreover, the court by its ruling raised a number of unanswered
questions. Chief of these was the question, if the workers have a
right to continuing seniority, to what, if anything, does the right
attach? Is it to the specific machinery?--or the end products? In
relating the facts the court stated:
The defendant removed a considerable part of its machinery from
its Elmhurst plant to the new Bethlehem plant, and manufactured
2 1id. at o5.
21 185 F. Supp. at 442.
"
9Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'0 Amicus curiae briefs have been filed by the following (listed in 30 U.S.L. Week 3112
[October 10, 1961]):
American Spice Trade Ass'n
California Mfrs. Ass'n
Cleveland Chamber of Commerce
Georgia State Chamber of Commerce
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce
Institute of Shortening & Edible Oils, Inc.
National Ass'n of Margarine Mfrs.
National Paint, Varnish & Lacquer Ass'n, Inc.
Ohio Chamber of Commerce
U. S. Chamber of Commerce.
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there a number of the same products. The Bethlehem plant was more
modern and efficient, and apparently had a considerable number of
new machines, in addition to the ones moved from Elmhurst. Some
of the products formerly made at Elmhurst were, after the closing of
that plant, made at the defendant's Louisville plant. 1
Even though the workers have not sought such, by the ruling of
the court, one wonders if they have a seniority right to jobs in the
Louisville plant because of transfer of products in spite of the fact
that its workers had their own separate and distinct collective bar-
gaining agreement? If there was no right at Louisville, on what basis
were the workers entitled to jobs at new equipment making new
products at the Bethlehem plant? It is not clear whether the old
equipment would be the primary factor even though job descrip-
tions were changed and incorporated different functions. "Plaintiffs
counsel conceded that even if all the 160-odd employees at the
Elmhurst plant had accepted employment at Bethlehem, Local 852
could not continue as accredited bargaining representative."3 Thus,
the question arises: Is the mere absence of a collective bargaining
agreement to be the governing factor? If so, the conclusion would
be doubtful if the Defendant had concluded a collective bargaining
agreement with local labor at the Bethlehem site before moving.
This possibility of conflict of seniority rights between two unions"
seems to be one of the most difficult problems raised by the instant
decision. Admittedly the company's treatment of the workers in
this case was harsh. But now that the existence of the problem is
recognized, the more simple and reasonable approach would seem to
be for the parties, who are the best judge of their problems, to
protect against harsh results through their collective bargaining
agreements, rather than for the courts to write provisions for them.
The decision could have far-reaching economic consequences.
Among the factors motivating a plant move to a new site are
cheaper labor, cheaper power, and closer proximity to raw materials.
Companies whose primary objective in moving is cheaper labor may
have second thoughts after viewing the extent to which this court
went to read vested rights into the collective bargaining agreement.
Such companies must either wait two or three years after termina-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement until seniority rights
have expired or risk possible liability to its employees. The first
31288 F.2d at 100.
32 185 F. Supp. at 448.
"' Additional legislation is a possible solution to this problem; however, further govern-
ment control seems contrary to the "free enterprise bargaining" policy of the National Labor
Relations Act. See note 5 supra.
1962] NOTES
